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COPYRIGHT LICENSES, NEW TECHNOLOGY
AND DEFAULT RULES: CONVERGING MEDIA,
DIVERGING COURTS?
Stacey M. Byrnes*
PROLOGUE
A 1986 copyright license granted the right to synchronize a musical
composition with a film on videocassette and to distribute videocassettes of
the film, reserving all other rights. The grantee distributes digital video
copies on its internet web-site. Some customers will use set-top boxes with
enough memory to store the entire film, offering a continuum of viewing
choices from immediate viewing to later playback. Other customers will
transfer copies of the movie to their home networks, playing incoming
video frames on their televisions ....
A 1968 license granted the right to publish sheet music for another
musical composition. The grantee publishes digitally scanned images of
the sheet music on the Web in NIFF' or SDML 2 format. Customers'
software players can read the digital format and play a synthesized audio
performance of the music; the customers can download the software player
and digital sheet music into their wireless internet-enabled Personal Digital
Assistants ....
* J.D., 1984, Boalt Hall School of Law. Stacey Byrnes is currently a studio legal consultant
on intellectual property issues. The views expressed are of course her own. Ms. Byrnes wishes
to acknowledge the valuable substantive contributions, as well as the understanding, of Paul
Eggert; the support of Paul and Michael; and Nathan Canby's research and analysis on another
project which underpins the case law overview found in Part II of this article.
1. Notation Interchange File Format
2. Standard Music Description Language
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A 1951 license granted worldwide radio broadcast rights to a novel.
A third party, a books-on-tape publisher, has posted the novel on the
Internet (as potential customers may learn in their cars while surfing the
Web by voice command, using internet-enabled navigation consoles).
The audio book can be downloaded into consumers' cars and played back
as they drive home ....
Many lawyers are consulted.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Internet revolution has accelerated the pace of
technological change, interpreting the scope of copyright licenses for the
creation and dissemination of derivative works in new media has long
bedeviled the courts. In 1920, the Supreme Court in Manners v. Morosco
3
entered the fray when it was called upon to determine whether an
agreement granting the right to "perform and represent" a play included the
right to make a motion picture based upon the play.4 Over the years, the
courts have repeatedly wrestled with new technology issues through the
development of silent motion pictures, talking motion pictures, live
television, filmed television, home video and on. During the last decade,
the issue has emerged as hydra-headed, with the digitization of information
spawning new combinations of technology and devices. The fundamental
problem, however, is unchanged: how to determine whether a copyright
license embraces new technology.
Courts have ostensibly taken different approaches to determining
new use cases involving grants of rights for the creation and dissemination
of derivative works. Many, such as the Second Circuit, have apparently
focused solely on traditional contract interpretation principles.6 Other
courts, notably the Ninth Circuit, have invoked copyright policy as well as
contract principles in analyzing the breadth of licenses.7 This Article
analyzes the divergence between the Second and Ninth Circuit approaches
and examines whether the courts have adopted or should adopt any default
rules to decide close cases. The Article then considers whether copyright
policy should play any role in interpreting the scope of copyright licenses.
3. Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317, 325 (1920).
4. See id.
5. See, e.g., Boosey & Hawkes Music Pub. Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co. 145 F.3d 481 (2d Cir.
1998); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988); Bartsch v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
6. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d 150.
7. See generally Cohen, 845 F.2d 851.
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Part II summarizes key factors courts generally consider in these
cases. Part III examines the different judicial approaches to interpreting the
scope of licenses involving derivative works and considers whether those
differences are embodied in specialized default rules.8 This section focuses
on two influential decisions-the Second Circuit's Bartsch v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer9 and the Ninth Circuit's Cohen v. Paramount Pictures
Corp. 0 -as well as the Second Circuit's recent interpretation and
affirmation of Bartsch in Boosey & Hawkes Music Pub. Ltd. v. Disney
Co." Also considered is Nimmer's identification of two judicial
approaches to the new use analysis,' 2 and the utility of that identification
either as an explication of existing case law or as a factor in the decision-
making process. The Article concludes that default rules have not been
established and that the Nimmer categories, rather than aiding in the
analysis, have contributed to the misperception that default rules exist. The
Article also concludes that the divergence in the approaches of the Second
and Ninth Circuits results primarily from their differing views on the
significance of copyright policy in the new use analysis.
Part IV examines the nature of the Ninth Circuit's invocation of
copyright policy, analyzing whether it is better understood as a pro-grantor
approach, grounded in the policy favoring certainty in copyright transfers
and ownership, or as a pro-author approach, grounded in a belief that the
aim of copyright is the protection of authors. This section then explores the
importance of derivative works, and considers whether a default rule
favoring an author of an underlying work over an author of a derivative
work would be consistent with copyright policy. The Article examines the
need to balance the rights of authors of underlying works and the rights of
authors of derivative works, concluding that the benefit to the public from
the creation and dissemination of derivative works militates against the
establishment of a default rule or other interpretive rule automatically
favoring authors of underlying works.
8. The term "default" is generally used in this article to mean something akin to what
commentators have referred to as an "untailored default," which "provides the parties to all
contracts with a single, off-the-rack standard that in some sense represents what the majority of
contracting parties would want." Ian Ayres & Robert Gertnert, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989). For potential
default rules based on copyright policy, however, it may be more accurate to say that any rule
would be intended to, in some sense, represent what Congress would want.
9. 391 F.2d 150.
10. 845 F.2d 851.
11. 145 F.3d481.
12. See generally 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
10.10(A), at 10-86 (1999).
246 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:243
Part V considers the advisability of employing any default rule,
whether pro-grantor or pro-grantee, in new use cases. The Article
concludes that a default rule is unnecessary and points out an extant
procedural alternative. Part VI goes beyond the issue of default rules to
consider whether copyright policy should have any role in interpreting the
scope of copyright licenses in the new use context. The Article concludes
that it should, arguing that the purposes and policies of the Copyright Act
support the development and application of a federal common law of
contracts to interpret the scope of copyright grants. At a minimum, state
rules of construction should be tested against copyright policy before those
rules are employed, a step which the Ninth Circuit has taken.
II. CASE LAW OVERVIEW
When interpreting the scope of a copyright license, all courts attempt
to ascertain the intent of the parties, whether by construing the contract as a
self-contained whole or by referring to extrinsic evidence. Courts consider
the breadth of the granting language, including the existence and scope of
any future technology clause and the presence or absence of specific or
general reservations of rights clauses, as well as the general tenor of the
contract. 13 Courts also consider industry practice, 14 the course of dealing of
the parties, the parties' subsequent conduct,15 the parties' contracts with
third parties 16 and other expressions of the parties' actual intent. Courts
13. A classic example is Manners, 252 U.S. 317. There, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a grant of "the sole and exclusive license and liberty to produce, perform and
represent" the play Peg O 'My Heart included the right to "represent" the play in motion pictures.
Id. at 325. In concluding that it did not, the Court reasoned:
It may be assumed that those words might carry the right to represent the play in
moving pictures if the other terms pointed that way, but to our mind they are
inconsistent with any such intent. We need not discuss the abstract question
whether in view of the fact that such a mode of representation was familiar, it was
to be expected that it should be mentioned if it was to be granted or should be
excluded if it was to be denied. Every detail shows that a representation by spoken
drama alone is provided for.
Id. at 325-26. As demonstrated below, the courts may have been wise to continue to avoid
addressing abstract questions in this area.
14. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., No. 91-56248, 1993 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4068, at *10 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 1993) (considering evidence of parties' intentions
reflected in reports of negotiators, course of negotiations, parties' subsequent conduct and
industry custom); cf. Goodis v. United Artists Television, Inc., 425 F.2d 397, 406 (2nd Cir.
1970); Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 216 F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir.
1954) (considering evidence of industry practice regarding character rights).
15. See Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 446 F. Supp. 725, 728-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(considering evidence of parties' subsequent actions in interpreting contracts).
16. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d 150. Based on the courts' responses to this type of evidence, its
persuasiveness is open to doubt. In Bartsch, for example, evidence that Warner Bros., the
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may also take into account the sophistication of the parties and the identity
of the drafting party.
17
The nature of the technology at issue and its foreseeability are
generally considered as well. Some courts finding that copyright grants do
not include new uses focus on technological distinctions between the
enumerated media and the new media.'8 Other courts finding grants broad
enough to encompass new media do so despite technical distinctions.'
9
grantee, had often obtained express television rights did not impress the court:
[Flor all that appears Warner Brothers may have decided that, in dealing with
Bartsch, it would be better tactics to rely on general words that were sufficiently
broad rather than seek an express inclusion and perhaps end up with the opposite,
or may have used a form regular in the industry without thinking very precisely
about television, or perhaps most likely-may simply have parroted the language in
the grant from Bartsch's assignors to him on the theory it would thus be getting all
he had, whatever that might be.
Id. at 154-55; see also Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co., 821 F. Supp. 341, 347
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (rejecting plaintiffs comparison of agreement at issue to contemporaneous
agreement between Disney and third party regarding same film, the court stated that "for obvious
reasons [the third-party agreement] does not resolve the ambiguity that exists in the agreement" at
issue); Landon v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
("[I]n any event, contracts made between Fox and other copyright owners have little probative
value as to what Fox and Landon intended in their particular agreement.").
17. See Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1391 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that ambiguity there
should be construed against the drafter-grantee, especially given the relative expertise and
experience of the two parties); cf. S.O.S. v. Payday, 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989)
(disapproving the presumption against drafter-grantor in context of construing scope of copyright
license).
18. See Rey, 990 F.2d at 1389-90 (quoting Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d
851, at 53-54 (9th Cir. 1988)); Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853-54 (comparing videocassette and
television); Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956) (comparing
projection and televising of motion picture); Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188
N.E. 163, 165-66 (N.Y. 1933) (addressing motion pictures and talking pictures); General Mills,
Inc. v. Filmtel Int'l Corp., 599 N.Y.S.2d 820, 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (comparing television to
videocassette and cable television); Tele-Pac, Inc. v. Grainger, 570 N.Y.S.2d 521, 523-25 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (comparing videocassette and television); cf. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 153 (finding
overall grant language broad enough to encompass exhibition of motion pictures on television,
however, the court expressed grave doubt about the district court's conclusion that the right "to
project, transmit and otherwise reproduce... by the art of cinematography or any process
analogous thereto" included television, which the appellate court considered involved "nigh
miraculous processes"); Raine v. CBS, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 434, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (addressing
television broadcast, cable television and video); Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Seaboard Surety
Co., 625 N.Y.S.2d 195, 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (noting prior holdings that "the terms
'television and/or broadcasting' do not extend to or include videocassettes or videodiscs for home
use").
19. See Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 F.3d 621, 630 (2nd Cir. 1995) (stating that "motion
picture" is not necessarily limited to a series of images on celluloid, but rather is broad enough to
include videocassette); Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc., 33 F.3d 518, 523-25 (5th Cir. 1994)
(finding that grant of both motion picture and television rights may encompass video); cf Kalem
Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61-62 (1911). In that vintage decision, the Supreme Court
seemed unmoved by technical distinctions in determining that production of a "moving-picture
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Courts have reached different conclusions regarding the foreseeability of
the same technology, such as videocassettes 20 and television. 2' Some
courts have arguably stretched to find new uses foreseeable.22
The presence of future technology clauses (e.g., "by any means now
known or hereafter developed") can be key considerations; many courts
have enforced those clauses.2 3 A future technology clause may modify the
definition of either the product to be created (e.g., a photoplay),24 the
film" violated the exclusive right of the writer of the book Ben Hur to "dramatize" his work. Id.
The court stated:
The essence of the matter... is not the mechanism employed, but that we see the
event or story lived. The motion pictures are only less vivid than reflections from a
mirror. With the former or with the latter our visual impression-what we see--is
caused by the real pantomime of real men through the medium of natural forces,
although the machinery is different and more complex.
Id.; Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc, 538 F. Supp. 211, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[W]hether
the exhibition apparatus is a home videocassette player or a television station's broadcast
transmitter, the films are 'exhibited' as images on home television screens."); Cinema Corp. of
Am. v. De Mille, 267 N.Y.S. 327, 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933) (holding dramatic rights and silent
motion picture rights together included talking motion picture rights).
20. Compare Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 ("Perhaps the primary reason why the words
'exhibition by means of television' in the license cannot be construed as including the distribution
of videocassettes for home viewing is that VCRs for home use were not invented or known in
1969, when the license was executed."), and Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F.
Supp. 166, 171-72 (D.D.C. 1992) (acknowledging non-existence of videocassettes at time of
1964 agreement), with Boosey & Hawkes Music Pub. Ltd. V. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481 (2d
Cir. 1998), and Bourne, 68 F.3d 621.
21. Compare Ettore, 229 F.2d 481, with Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154.
22. See Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486 ("Disney has proffered unrefuted evidence that a nascent
market for home viewing of feature films existed by 1939."); Bourne, 68 F.3d at 630 (holding
that the use of videocassettes could have been within parties' contemplation where evidence
showed that in 1930s, "home viewing of motion pictures was within the contemplation of persons
in the motion picture industry," defendant made certain cartoons available for home viewing, and
"non-celluloid methods of storing motion pictures... were under development"); Philadelphia
Orchestra, 821 F. 'Supp at 346 (declining to take judicial notice that home videos were not in
existence at the time of the 1939 contract, finding evidence that "home viewing devices" were
contemplated). See generally Gayley Rosen, Note, The Rights to Future Technologies: Should
Bourne v. Disney Change the Rules?, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 617, 629-31 (1997) (criticizing the
Bourne court's conclusion regarding home viewing devices).
23. Commentators have offered different perspectives on the desirability from the author's
point of view of enforcing these clauses. See, e.g., William Patry, The Failure of the American
Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 907, 927-28 (1997)
(suggesting that only technology expressly referred to in contract should be considered granted);
Carolina Saez, Enforcing Copyrights in the Age of Multimedia, 20 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 351, 372 (1995) (observing that "future technology clauses in older contracts may not
necessarily be as detrimental to an artist's interests as they may initially appear").
24. See Muller v. Walt Disney Prods., 871 F. Supp. 678, 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that
the right to exhibit film on video is encompassed by the broad definition of photoplay as "a
motion picture produced and/or exhibited with or accompanied by sound and/or reproducing
and/or transmitting devices, radio devices, television and all other improvements and devices
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permissible methods of distribution or the media in which the product may
be distributed.25  The effect of a clause may, however, be limited by a
narrow antecedent,26 although one court saw "no point in quibbling" about
whether the new technology fell within the antecedent clause where the
thrust of the grant was to embrace future technology.27 A specific
reservation of rights may also limit a future technology clause.
28
Although ordinarily sufficient, an expansive future technology clause
is not necessarily required. Many courts have found grants lacking those
clauses still broad enough to cover new uses.2 9 Courts have also addressed
the new technology issue in the context of actors' agreements, with and
without future technology clauses. Generally, courts have found grants of
which are now or hereafter may be used in connection with the production, exhibition and/or
transmission of any present or future kind of motion picture production").
25. See Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226, 227-28 (D. N.J. 1983)
(holding that the right to exhibit the film "by any means or methods now or hereafter known"
included video distribution); Wexley v. KTTV, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 558, 558 (S.D. Cal. 1952)
(holding that film could be exhibited on television where grant conveyed "right to make, produce,
adapt, sell, lease, license, sublicense, exhibit, exploit, perform, transmit and otherwise generally
deal in motion picture versions of the said dramatic composition and the title thereof in any
manner and method now or any time hereafter ever known or made available"); Hellman v.
Samuel Goldwyn Prods., 257 N.E.2d at 634, 634-35 (N.Y. 1970) (ruling that film could be
exhibited on television where grant conveyed right to "make, exhibit and market everywhere
motion pictures, trailers, sound records (in connection with motion pictures) and stills based upon
or adapted from the Property, using any methods or devices for such purposes which are now or
hereafter known or used").
26. See Tele-Pac, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (stating that video is not covered by clause granting
right to broadcast over future devices similar to television); see also Subaflms, 1993 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4068, at *4 (finding that future technology clause applied only to rights granted, which
evidence showed did not include video).
27. Muller, 871 F. Supp. at 682. The court found:
The definition of 'photoplay' clearly is intended to embrace new technology for the
'production, exhibition and/or transmission' of motion pictures. There is no point
in quibbling about whether home video involves production, exhibition or transmis-
sion. The contractual language is clearly designed to embrace future means by
which motion pictures can reach consumers, in public or in private.
Id.
28. See Filmvideo, 446 F. Supp. at 728-29 (stating that specific reservation of television and
video rights superseded future technology clause).
29. See Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486; Bourne, 68 F.3d at 630; Bloom, 33 F.3d at 525; Bartsch,
391 F.2d at 154; L.C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp., 83 F.2d 196 (2nd Cir. 1936); Philadelphia
Orchestra, 821 F. Supp. at 345; Landon, 384 F. Supp. at 454; Cinema Corp., 267 N.Y.S. at 327;
cf Maljack Prods., Inc., v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a grant of music rights-without a future technology clause but also without any
reservation clause-conveyed synchronization rights for video).
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rights to use actors' performances in films sufficiently broad to encompass
distribution on television or videocassette.
30
In interpreting the scope of a grant, courts lay different emphasis on
general reservation of rights clauses. For example, the Ninth Circuit, in
concluding that new media rights were not granted in Cohen v. Paramount
Pictures Corp., found that a general reservation indicated an intent to limit
the grant.3 ' Other courts, however, have disregarded general reservation
clauses.32 Courts have also expressed different views regarding the
effectiveness of a general reservation accompanied by a specific
reservation.33 Finally, some courts have found that the inclusion of a
specific reservation clause establishes that no general, broad reservation of
rights is otherwise in effect. In other words, the identification of specific
reserved rights indicates that all unenumerated rights were granted.34
30. See Republic Pictures Corp. v. Rogers, 213 F.2d 662, 665 (9th Cir. 1954); Autry v.
Republic Prods. Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 668 (9th Cir. 1954); Rooney, 538 F. Supp. at 212; see also
Brown, 799 F. Supp. 166.
31. See id.; cf. Maljack, 81 F.3d at 885 (distinguishing Cohen in finding that a music grant
without a general reservation clause included synchronization rights for video).
32. See, e.g., Boosey, 145 F.3d at 488; Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 n.l (referring to general
reservation clauses as "truism[s]"); Hellman, 257 N.E.2d at 685 (including a general reservation
clause in quotation of agreement, but failing to address the clause in its discussion).
33. Compare Trust Co. Bank v. MGMAJA Entertainment Co., 772 F.2d 740, 748 (1 1th Cir.
1985) (rejecting as "meritless" the argument that sequel rights were not reserved because not
enumerated where a general reservation clause was followed by a sentence stating that the
reserved rights "include, but are not limited to" enumerated rights), with Bloom, 33 F.3d at 524.
The Bloom court, in finding that motion picture and television rights encompassed all elements of
video, stated:
The rule of ejusdem generis applies where specific recitals in a contract are ether
preceded or followed by an omnibus clause that retains all rights not mentioned. In
such circumstances, courts often apply the rule to limit the actual rights reserved to
those specifically mentioned, or rights intimately analogous to those mentioned. As
such, having chosen not to specifically reserve the video rights in their reservation
clause, the appellants cannot prosper by this boilerplate, catch-all clause.
Id.
34. See Landon, 384 F. Supp. at 454. The Landon court stated:
[W]hen the parties sought to reserve to Landon certain rights, they did so carefully
and specifically. Such reservations are themselves strong evidence that if Landon
had intended to reserve the right to make televised versions of the property, she and
her noted and experienced literary agents... knew how to do so.
Id.; cf. Brown, 799 F. Supp. at 171 (holding that the prohibition of the specific use of a singer's
performance in film, given broad grant language, "indicates that all other uses not specifically
prohibited are transferred to the grantee").
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Ill. THE COURTS' DIVERGENT VIEWS ON THE INTERPRETATION OF THE
SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT LICENSES
Considerable confusion exists regarding whether the courts have
either expressly or impliedly recognized any default rules in interpreting
copyright licenses. A 1968 Second Circuit decision, Bartsch v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer,35 was read as establishing a "tie goes to the grantee"
rule.36 The Ninth Circuit's subsequent decision in Cohen v. Paramount
Pictures Corp.37 was read as endorsing a "tie goes to the grantor" rule.38
Thirty years after Bartsch, the Second Circuit in Boosey & Hawkes Music
Pub. Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co. 39 stated that Bartsch had established no
default rule but rather had followed a "neutral principles" approach to new
use questions, which the Second Circuit reaffirmed. 40 The Boosey court
contrasted the Ninth Circuit's approach, which it believed reflected a
default rule in favor of the grantor/author.4'
In Boosey, as in Bartsch, the Second Circuit invoked Nimmer's
identification of two approaches to new use questions: the first, that:
a license of rights in a given medium (e.g., 'motion picture
rights') includes only such uses as fall within the unambiguous
core meaning of the term (e.g., exhibition of motion picture film
35. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cit. 1968).
36. See, e.g., Trust Co. Bank v. MGM/UA Entertainment Co., 772 F.2d 740, 749 n.7 (11th
Cir. 1985). The court stated:
[T]his is not to say that the evidence of intent was so convincing on both sides, or,
alternatively, so meager, as to require application of the general construction rule
that in doubtful cases a clause such as [para.] 7(a)(i)(2) should be construed as a
restriction of a grant rather than a reservation in order to maximize the grant to the
grantee.
Id. (citing Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155); see also Philadelphia Orchestra Ass'n v. Walt Disney Co.,
821 F. Supp. 341, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155) ("There is precedent for
placing the burden of clarity upon the party granting rights...."); Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v.
Hastings, 446 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("[T]he words of the grant are to be construed
against the grantor...."); cf Brown v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 799 F. Supp. 166, 171
(D.D.C. 1992) (interpreting scope of agreement regarding use of singer's performance in film,
court, citing Bartsch, referred to "the well-established rule placing the burden on the grantor to
establish a pertinent reservation of rights"). See Michael R. Fuller, Hollywood Goes Interactive:
Licensing Problems Associated With Re-Purposing Motion Pictures Into Interactive Multimedia
Videogames, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 599, 609-613 (1995) (discussing Nimmer's approaches, set
out below, as pro-licensor and pro-licensee, and using Cohen and Bartsch as respective
examples).
37. See Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
38. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481,487 (2d
Cir. 1988); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
39. 145 F.3d 481.
40. See Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487.
41. See id.
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in motion picture theaters) and exclude any uses which lie
within the ambiguous penumbra (e.g., exhibition of motion
picture film on television),42
and the second, pursuant to which "the licensee may properly pursue any
uses that may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in
the license. 43 As discussed below, however, the Nimmer categories are
seriously flawed. More importantly, the use of these categories,44 along
with the related quest for default rules, obscures the true and potentially
critical difference between the Second and Ninth Circuits' approaches to
new use cases: the role of copyright policy in interpreting copyright
licenses.
A. Bartsch, Cohen and Boosey
1. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
In Bartsch, the Second Circuit addressed whether a grant of motion
picture rights in a musical play encompassed the right to televise that
play. 45 The grant in Bartsch of "the motion picture rights throughout the
world" included the right "to project, transmit and otherwise reproduce the
said musical play or any adaptation or version thereof visually or audibly
by the art of cinematography or any process analogous thereto, and to
copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture photoplays
throughout the world.' 4 6  Plaintiff Bartsch reserved certain German
language motion picture rights, with the proviso that "it is expressly
understood and agreed that nothing herein contained shall in any way limit
or restrict the absolute right of Purchaser to produce, release, distribute
and/or exhibit the photoplay or photoplays produced hereunder.' 4 7  A
general reservation clause was also included:
The rights which the [defendant] obtains from the Owner in [the
play] are specifically limited to those granted herein. All other
42. Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486-87.
43. Id.
44. See generally, NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12. As one commentator has noted,
"What began as Nimmer's descriptive schema to detail the facts after the decision has been
reached, seems to have developed into a conscious analytic tool used to examine the facts in the
process of actually reaching that decision." Barbara D. Griff, Note, A New Use For an Old
License: Who Owns The Right?, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 53, 76 (1995). Case law illustrates this
point. See, e.g., Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1388 (1st Cir. 1993).
45. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d 150.
46. Id. at 151.
47. Id. at 152.
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rights now in existence or which may hereafter come into
existence shall always be reserved to the Owner and for his sole
benefit, but nothing herein contained shall in any way limit or
restrict the rights which Purchaser has acquired or shall hereafter
acquire from any other person, firm or corporation in and to [the
play] .48
The court explicitly rejected reliance on the federal common law of
contracts to interpret the license.49 Applying New York law, the court
found that Bartsch "had reason to know"50 of television's potential at the
time of the grant and the court concluded that the broad assignment of the
right "to copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture
photoplays throughout the world" included the right to televise the motion
picture.5' The court stated: "[t]he words of Bartsch's assignment ... were
well designed to give the assignee the broadest rights with respect to its
copyrighted property, to wit, the photoplay. 'Exhibit' means to 'display' or
to 'show' by any method, and nothing in the rest of the grant sufficiently
reveals a contrary intention.',52 In reaching its conclusion, the court gave
no weight to the general reservation clause, stating: "We cannot read this as
standing for more than the truism that whatever Bartsch had not granted, he
had retained.
53
In its reasoning, the court invoked the two interpretive approaches set
out in Nimmer:
With Bartsch dead, his grantors apparently so, and the Warner
Brothers lawyer understandably having no recollection of the
negotiation, any effort to reconstruct what the parties actually
intended nearly forty years ago is doomed to failure. In the end,
decision must turn, as Professor Nimmer has suggested,... on a
choice between two basic approaches more than on an attempt to
distill decisive meaning out of language that very likely had
none. As between an approach that "a license of rights in a
given medium (e.g., 'motion picture rights') includes only such
uses as fall within the unambiguous core meaning of the term
(e.g., exhibition of motion picture film in motion picture
theaters) and exclude any uses which lie within the ambiguous
penumbra (e.g., exhibition of motion picture film on television)"
48. Id.
49. See id. at 153-54.
50. Id. at 154.
51. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 151.
52. Id. at 154.
53. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 n.1.
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and another whereby "the licensee may properly pursue any uses
which may reasonably be said to fall within the medium as
described in the license," he prefers the latter. So do we... If the
words are broad enough to cover the new use, it seems fairer that
the burden of framing and negotiating an exception should fall
on the grantor; if Bartsch or his assignors had desired to limit
"exhibition" of the motion picture to the conventional method
where light is carried from a projector to a screen directly beheld
by the viewer, they could have said so.
54
The court went on to point out the benefit to the public of using
Nimmer's second approach in the case before it:
A further reason favoring the broader view in a case like this is
that it provides a single person who can make the copyrighted
work available to the public over the penumbral medium,
whereas the narrower one involves the risk that a deadlock
between the grantor and the grantee might prevent the work's
being shown over the new medium at all. Quite apart from the
probable impracticality, the assignments are broad enough even
on plaintiff's view to prevent the copyright owners from
licensing anyone else to make a photoplay for telecasting. The
risk that some May might find the nation's television screens
bereft of the annual display of "Maytime," interlarded with the
usual liberal diet of commercials, is not one a court can take
lightly. 5
2. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp.
In Cohen, the licensee was granted the right "to record, in any
manner, medium, form or language" the musical composition at issue and
"to make copies of such recordings and to perform said musical
compositions everywhere, all in accordance with the terms, conditions and
limitations hereinafter set forth., 56 The contract stated that the license to
perform the composition was granted for the exhibition of the motion
picture: a) "to audiences in motion picture theatres and other places of
public entertainment where motion pictures are customarily exhibited[;]"
and b) "by ... means of television ... including 'pay television,'
'subscription television' and 'closed circuit into homes' television."57
54. Id. at 155 (citation omitted).
55. Id.
56. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853 (emphasis omitted).
57. Id.
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The defendant's primary argument was that distribution of
videocassettes for home viewing was the equivalent of "exhibition by
means of television. '58 The court found that the terms of the contract
"must be tortured to expand the limited right granted by that section to an
entirely different means of making that film available to the general public"
and explicated at some length the differences between video and
television. 59 The court then went on to say that "[p]erhaps the primary
reason why the words 'exhibition by means of television' in the license
cannot be construed as including the distribution of videocassettes for
home viewing is that VCR's for home use were not invented or known in
1969 when the license was executed., 60 The court opined that "[t]he holder
of the license should not now 'reap the entire windfall' associated with the
new medium." 61  The court concluded that a clause in the contract
reserving "all rights and uses in and to said musical composition except
those herein granted" to the defendant operated "to preclude uses not then
known to, or contemplated by the parties. 62 The court also stated:
Moreover, the license must be construed in accordance with the
purpose underlying federal copyright law. Courts have
repeatedly stated that the Copyright Act was "intended
definitively to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors,
publishers, etc., ... 'to afford greater encouragement to the
production of literary works of lasting benefit to the world."
63
The court concluded: "[W]e would frustrate the purposes of the Act
were we to construe this license-with its limiting language-as granting a
right in a medium that had not been introduced to the domestic market at
the time the parties entered into the agreement." 64
58. Id. at 854.
59. Id. at 853.
60. Id. at 854.
61. Id. (citing Neil R. Nagano, Comment, Past Copyright Licenses and the New Video
Software Medium, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1160, 1184 (1982)). The court prefaced its statement with
the following:
[I]n 1969-ong before the market for videocassettes burgeoned--Cohen could not
have assumed that the public would have free and virtually unlimited access to the
film in which the composition was played; instead, he must have assumed that
viewer access to the film... would be largely controlled by theatres and networks.
By the same token, the original licensee could not have bargained for, or paid for,
the rights associated with video reproduction.
Id.
62. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
63. Id. (quoting Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939)).
64. Id.
256 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:243
3. Boosey & Hawkes Music Pub. v. Walt Disney Co.
Following a self-described "neutral principles ' 65 approach, the
Second Circuit in Boosey found that film music could be included in
videocassettes of a motion picture where the defendant was granted the
right "to record [the composition] in any manner, medium or form" and to
use the composition "in one motion picture. 66 Relying on Bartsch, the
court concluded that a general grant could be sufficient to convey the right
at issue, at least where the new use was foreseeable. 67 Eschewing the
interpretation of Bartsch as establishing a default rule in favor of the
grantee in new use cases, the Boosey court stated that Bartsch had simply
instructed courts to rely on the language of the license and basic principles
68of contract construction.
In discussing "the capacity of a broad license to cover future
developed markets resulting from new technologies," the Second Circuit
again invoked Nimmer's description of the two primary approaches to the
issue.69 Boosey cited Cohen as following the approach that a license "'in a
given medium (e.g., "motion picture rights") includes only such uses as fall
within the unambiguous core meaning of the term (e.g., exhibition of
motion picture film in motion picture theaters) and excludes any uses that
lie within the ambiguous penumbra (e.g., exhibition of motion pictures on
television)."' 70  The Boosey court opined that "[u]nder this approach, a
license given in 1939 to 'motion picture' rights would include only the core
uses of 'motion picture' as understood in 1939-presumably theatrical
distribution-and would not include subsequently developed methods of
distribution of a motion picture such as television videocassettes or laser
disc.",71 The Second Circuit reiterated its preference for Nimmer's second
approach, which would permit the licensee to "'pursue any uses that may
reasonably be said to fall within the medium as described in the license."'
72
65. Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487.
66. Id. at 484.
67. See id. at 486.
68. See id. at 487.
69. See id. at 486.
70. Id. at 486 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, at 10-90).
71. Boosey, 145 F.3d at 486.
72. Id. at 486-87 (citing NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, at 10-91). The court
observed:
We acknowledge that a result which deprives the author-licensor of participation in
the profits of new unforeseen channels of distribution is not an altogether happy
solution. Nonetheless, we think it more fair and sensible than a result that would
deprive a contracting party of the rights reasonably found in the terms of the
contract it negotiated.
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B. Analyzing the Approaches
1. Nimmer's Categories
Nimmer's categories generate analytical confusion, as illustrated in
the Boosey court's use of the categories. The first approach is an absolutist
one, pursuant to which any ambiguity in the grant language means, in
essence, no grant. The Cohen court did not take such an unqualified view,
however. The Boosey court's implied, incorrectly, that Cohen exemplifies
the first approach. Furthermore, by relying on Nimmer's second approach,
as did the Bartsch court, the Boosey court suggested that uses within the
"ambiguous penumbra" fall within the medium described in the license. In
other words, the ambiguity is resolved in favor of the grantee.73 The
Boosey court thus fueled rather than refuted other courts'
"misinterpretation" of Bartsch as creating a default rule in favor of the
copyright licensee. 4
In any event, whether intended to capture existing case law or to
influence the direction of the decisions, the Nimmer categories are
unsatisfactory and should be abandoned. The categories do not reflect the
various factors that the courts consider in analyzing new use questions.
Rather, the categories concentrate solely on the grant language. None of
the courts, however, focuses their inquiry so narrowly. Furthermore, many
factors figure into the construction of a contract, and the cases are so fact-
specific, that the approaches are not reducible to two, even in broad strokes.
As in any other area involving the interpretation of contracts, the decisions
are multi-dimensional; they cannot be accurately represented by two points.
Consequently, using limited categories suggests a starker contrast between
the circuits than the cases warrant. The categories similarly fail as guides,
for they force a choice between incomplete alternatives and, further, stack
the deck by presenting one as the choice of courts following a rule of
reason and the other as the choice only of doctrinaire courts.
A final, and more fundamental, reason to abandon the categories is
that the premise upon which they are built is faulty. That categories are
essentially grounded in the notion that a search for the parties' intent will
generally be fruitless because the parties most likely will not have formed
Id. at 487. The court also noted that "the creation of exceptional principles of contract
construction that place[] doubt on the capacity of a license to transfer new technologies is likely
to harm licensors and licensees together." Id. at 488 n.4.
73. See id. at 487. This goes beyond a tie-breaking rule, for ambiguity's range extends at
least from "probably yes" to "probably no."
74. See id. at 487 n.3.
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an intent. This posits that the only relevant inquiry is whether the parties at
the time of the contract specifically intended that the creator of a derivative
work would be able to exploit that new work in a particular medium.
Nothing compels this extraordinarily narrow inquiry, which also often
underlies the courts' analyses, but so casting the question essentially
requires a court to invoke a default rule or to engage in contortions
regarding the foreseeability of the medium at issue.
2. Bartsch, Cohen and Default Rules
Freed from the artificial constraints of the Nimmer categories,
reevaluation of the facts of Cohen and Bartsch/Boosey indicates not only
that neither Circuit court established a default rule but that the courts'
approaches do not diverge as radically as first appears.75 A close reading of
the cases suggests that each court, faced with the other's facts, may well
have reached the same result. The language of Cohen does not suggest that
the Ninth Circuit would take issue with the Second Circuit's desire to avoid
"a result that would deprive a contracting party of the rights reasonably
found in the terms of the contract it negotiates. 76  The Cohen court
nowhere intimated that it considered video "reasonably found in the terms
of the contract[;]" the contrary is true.
77
The Cohen court viewed the grant language as specific, not general.7 8
The license set out the two media in which the film with the song could be
exhibited,79 and the Cohen court decided that exhibition by videocassette is
not the same as exhibition by television broadcasting."0 Notably, the grants
did not include any broad term, such as "distribute," "disseminate" or
"exploit" and did not even indicate that the performance rights granted
"included, without limitation," or even "included" the two media specified
in the grant.8 ' In opining that construing the grant at issue to encompass
television would thwart copyright policy, the court emphasized the grant's
"limiting language." 82 Faced with what it perceived as a narrow grant, with
75. See generally Boosey, 145 F.3d 481; Cohen, 845 F.2d 851.
76. Boosey, 145 F.3d at 487.
77. See generally Cohen, 845 F.2d 851.
78. See id. at 854.
79. See id. at 853.
80. Id. at 854. Although one could argue that the court tilted the equation by narrowly
defining the issue, the response would be that the grant language determines the breadth of the
issue.
81. See generally id.
82. Id. at 854. The court also used the general reservation clause, which use may or may not
have been independent of its invocation of copyright principles, to support its decision. See id.
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specific technology addressed in definite terms, the court found a new
technology not covered.83 There is no reason to believe that the Second
Circuit would have reached a different conclusion. Likewise, there is no
reason to believe that the Ninth Circuit would have reached a different
conclusion in either Bartsch or Boosey than did the Second Circuit. Both
cases (particularly Bartsch) involved grants broader than the one in Cohen,
with the technology of dissemination not addressed in specific terms. In
sum, the Ninth Circuit had a limited grant and what it considered an
unforeseeable use; the Second Circuit had broad grants and what it
considered foreseeable uses. None of the decisions turned upon a default
rule.
3. The Significance of Copyright Policy
Although the Ninth Circuit's willingness to explicitly consider
copyright policy is an important point of distinction from the Second
Circuit, interpreting Cohen as, through dicta, establishing a default rule
based on that policy runs counter to the tenor of the decision and overstates
the differences between the circuits' approaches. A fair reading of Cohen
suggests that the court did not rely upon copyright policy, but rather
reached its result by ascertaining the intent of the parties, and then found
that result consonant with copyright policy. Similarly, although the Second
Circuit ostensibly relied solely on state law contract interpretation
principles to reach its conclusions in Bartsch and Boosey, the opinions
reflect the implied consideration of copyright policy.84 In any event, the
circuit courts' views of the relevance of copyright policy to the new use
questions were not critical to their decisions. The only outcome-
Reference to that clause, however, apparently was not necessary, for the agreement was non-
exclusive and in no way could have been interpreted as an all-rights grant. See id. (explaining
that the agreement was not exclusive).
83. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854. The Boosey court's suggestion that the Ninth Circuit was
creating "exceptional principles of contract construction that place[] doubt on the capacity of a
license to transfer new technologies" seems unwarranted for similar reasons. See Boosey, 145
F.2d at 488 n.4. The Cohen court did indeed make sweeping, apparently generalized statements
when referring to the benefits from new technology as a windfall and suggested that
unforeseeable uses could not have been bargained for. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854. However,
decisions, not dicta, are necessary to create "exceptional principles of contract construction." In
Cohen, two specific media were included in the bargain. Id. at 852. The court found the new
medium encompassed within neither, that is, the parties had not in fact bargained for the new
medium. Id. Determining whether they could have done so was not necessary, and the Ninth
Circuit is unlikely to read Cohen as having made that determination. See infra note 86.
84. Compare Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853-54, with Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154-55. In Bartsch,
the Second Circuit implicitly used copyright policy to buttress the conclusion that it reached using
contract interpretation principles. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154-55.
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determinative differences between the two circuits, as so far expressed,
appear to be the weight they place on a general reservation of rights clause
and their views regarding when video became foreseeable.
8 5
Nonetheless, regardless of whether the courts' opinions would
diverge if faced with each other's facts, the decisions raise the issue of
whether copyright policy should affect the interpretation of copyright
transfers where a new use question involves a derivative work. The next
section broadens the examination of the Ninth Circuit's use of copyright
policy in new use cases and considers the importance of derivative works,
as groundwork for the following section's discussion of whether a default
rule or interpretive rule automatically favoring grantor/authors is
appropriate.
IV. COPYRIGHT POLICY AND THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTHORS
A. The Ninth Circuit's View
Whether or not the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the purposes of
the Copyright Act affected the outcome of any of its new use decisions, the
court has undeniably advanced an interpretive rule favoring the grantor in
the context of a grant of specified rights.86 Less clear is whether the Ninth
Circuit's view is pro-grantor/owner or instead pro-grantor/author.
A year after Cohen, the Ninth Circuit, in S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc.,
8 7
considered whether a software license allowed the defendant to make
copies of the plaintiffs series of programs. Stating that the "license must
be construed in accordance with the purposes underlying federal copyright
law,, 88 the court went on to find that the district court incorrectly
interpreted the contract at issue against the drafter.8 9  The court stated,
"[t]his result is contrary to federal copyright policy. Copyright licenses are
assumed to prohibit any use not authorized." 90 As in Cohen, the court's
85. Even that difference is not as great as it appears. The parties in Cohen had stipulated to
the lack of foreseeability. See Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
86. The Ninth Circuit recently refused to apply such a rule to an all-rights grant. In Maijack
Prod., Inc. v. Goodtimes Home Video Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 885 (9th Cir. 1996), the court rejected
plaintiff's reading of Cohen that "absent a future technologies clause, the author/grantor always
reserves the right to exploit the work in new mediums." Id. After noting that Cohen had relied
on a reservation clause, the MaIjack court stated "[h]ere, the contract states without exception that
all musical rights were granted." Id.
87. 866 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
88. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 866 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989).
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1994); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851,
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assertions regarding copyright policy were unnecessary to its decision.
S.O.S. turned on the following reasoning, "[t]he contract between S.O.S.
and Payday states 'This series of programs is the property of SOS, and
Payday is acquiring the right of use, SOS retains all rights of ownership.'
This language is unambiguous." 91  If the language was unambiguous,
invocation of either copyright policy or the rule interpreting ambiguity
against the drafter was unnecessary.
Cohen and S.O.S. were apparently based on the need for certainty in
transfers of ownership without regard to the identity of the owner. In fact,
Cohen discussed the Copyright Act's intent to "grant valuable, enforceable
rights to authors, publishers, etc...., 92 Further, S.O.S. cited to § 204 of the
1976 Copyright Act,93 which requires a writing for the transfer of a
copyright interest, to support its statement that "copyright licenses are
assumed to prohibit any use not authorized." 94 The court thus did not limit
its holding to the protection of authors.95
The Ninth Circuit has, however, articulated pro-author sentiment in
related contexts. For example, in Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System,96 the court considered whether a license to plaintiff
Warner Bros. for rights in connection with the book entitled The Maltese
Falcon precluded Dashiell Hammett and his publisher from granting third
parties the right to use certain characters in the book.9 7 The court,
853 (9th Cir. 1988) (transfer of copyright ownership must be in writing)). At least one district
court appeared to believe that the Ninth Circuit would not have found the principle contrary to
copyright policy had the licensee been the drafter. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
759 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (applying California law where ambiguities were to be
interpreted against the drafter-licensee, while following S.O.S.'s perceived directive "to interpret
copyright licenses narrowly"); see also Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216
F.2d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 1954). The Warner Bros. court stated:
The instruments under which Warner claims were prepared by Warner Bros.
Corporation which is a large, experienced moving picture producer. It would seem
proper, therefore, to construe the instruments under the assumption that the
claimant knew what it wanted and that in defining the item in the instruments
which it desired and intended to take, it included all of the items it was contracting
to take.
Id. at 949.
91. S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1088.
92. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (emphasis added) (quoting Washington Publ'g Co. v. Pearson,
306 U.S. 30 (1939)).
93. See S.O.S., 866 F.2d at 1088.
94. Id. (emphasis omitted).
95. But see Apple Computer, 759 F. Supp. at 1451 ("[T]he Ninth Circuit has directed district
courts to interpret copyright licenses narrowly, consistent with the federal copyright policy of
providing incentives in the form of copyright protections to authors.").
96. 216 F.2d 945.
97. See id. at 950.
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apparently construing the agreement against Warner Bros. as the drafting
party,98 stated:
We are of the opinion that since the use of characters and
character names are nowhere specifically mentioned in the
agreements, but that other items, including the title, "The
Maltese Falcon", and their use are specifically mentioned as
being granted, that the character rights with the names cannot be
held to be within the grants and that under the doctrine of
ejusdem generis, general language cannot be held to include
them. As was said[,J... "such doubt as there is should be
resolved in favor of the composer. The clearest language is
necessary to divest the author of the fruits of his labor. Such
language is lacking here."
99
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has not injected a pro-author (or even
pro-grantor) view into all contract disputes. In the 1996 Maljack case, the
court rejected outright the plaintiff's argument that, under Cohen, a grant
lacking a future technology clause reserved new media rights to the grantor
even where the grant was of all rights in the work and included no
reservation. 100 In another decision that year, Yount v. Rose-Opryland,""' the
court considered whether a joint composer's assignment of his interest in a
song included the copyright renewal period where at the time of the
assignment he had only a royalty interest to convey.102  The plaintiff
attempted to rely on the federal common law rule of construction pursuant
to which an assignment of copyright is deemed to transfer rights in the
renewal period only when it does so expressly. After rejecting that
argument and finding that the issue was one of state law only, 0 3 the court
addressed Yount's argument that the copyright laws were designed to
protect authors. The court stated:
98. See id.
99. Id. at 949 (citations omitted).
100. The Maljack court went further, relying on Cohen to support its decision. 81 F.3d at
885.
101. 103 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 1996).
102. See Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103 F.3d 830, 833 (9th Cir. 1996). Specifically,
Yount and others entered into a publishing agreement for the song Release Me with a record
company in 1949. See id. at 832. The grant included the right to secure the copyright and to hold
it, "including any and all renewals of copyright to which the writer(s) may be entitled hereafter,"
in exchange for royalties. See id. Yount subsequently assigned to Stevenson "all of my rights,
title and interest in and to the song entitled 'RELEASE ME."' Id. Yount sued Stevenson's
predecessor-in-interest for royalties during the renewal period. See id. at 833.
103. See id. at 832.
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No doubt they were. However, that assertion does not
significantly advance the analysis or indicate that contractual
royalty interests have a protection separate from the protection
afforded to renewal of the term of the copyright itself. Authors
are not the only ones protected by the Copyright Act. Moreover,
protection of authors may well come from laws that give them
the freedom to contract at will rather than from laws, which
prevent them "from realizing on their assets when they are most
in need of flnds." Generally speaking, it is for Congress, not the
courts, to decide just how much protection is needed and what
form that protection should take. Congress has not declared a
special rule regarding contractual royalties during the renewal
term of copyright.04
The court concluded:
There can be little doubt that Yount made an assignment of his
royalty rights to Stevenson. He now seeks to cast himself in the
mold of a put-upon author, who should have the special
protection of the Copyright Act to save him from his own lack
of discretion. But authors are not "wards under guardianship of
the law." Indeed, we, along with the Supreme Court, assume
that they would resent being treated as if they were. Congress
and the courts have provided some protection for authors as far
as the twenty-eight-year copyright renewal term is concerned,
but that form of protection ends once the term has been
explicitly transferred. Authors are free to deal with any ensuing
contract rights, such as royalties, as they will, subject only to the
provisions of state law. 05
Although the Ninth Circuit may, when faced with the question,
interpret Cohen as espousing a rule favoring grantor/authors, Ninth Circuit
case law does not present the unidimensional view of copyright policy
which might warrant predicting such a result.' °6 In fact, as noted above, the
court's invocation of copyright policy in Cohen may well have been driven
more by concerns about certainty than concerns about authors. 0 7 The court
has perhaps not so neatly divided the two, however, and, whether seen as a
104. Id. at 834 (quoting Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 657
(1943).
105. Id. at 836-37 (quoting Fred Fisher Music, 318 U.S. at 657).
106. See, e.g., id. at 832.
107. See infra Part IV.B. This accords with the Ninth Circuit's other strong statements
about the significance of the 1976 Copyright Act's writing requirement embodied in § 204. See
supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text
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decision supporting a pro-grantor or a pro-author stance, Cohen raises the
specter of the creation of a default rule that would disregard the importance
of author/grantees in the derivative work context. As discussed below,
such a rule would be contrary to the purposes of the Copyright Act.
B. Underlying and Derivative Works: Two Authors
Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries. '0 8 The Supreme Court has
stated that "[t]he clause thus describes both the objective which Congress
may seek and the means to achieve it. The objective is to promote the
progress of science and the arts .... To accomplish its purpose, Congress
may grant to authors the exclusive right to the fruits of their respective
works. ,10 9
The term "author" is not limited to individual writers of original
compositions, but includes "he to whom anything owes its origin."" 0 The
Supreme Court has affirmed that "[t]he primary objective of copyright is
not to reward the labor of authors, but to 'promote the Progress of Science
and the useful Arts."" The Court has also stated:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. "The sole interest of the United States and the primary
object in conferring the monopoly," this Court has said, "lie in
the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors." When technological change has rendered its literal
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "[C]opyright property under the Federal law is wholly
statutory, and depends upon the right created under the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of
the authority conferred under article 1, § 8 of the Federal Constitution." Bobbs-Merril Co. v.
Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
109. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
110. Id. at 561.
111. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light
of this basic purpose.12
The public benefit derived from creating incentives for the
preparation and dissemination of derivative works such as motion pictures
has been widely recognized. The Supreme Court in Goldstein v. California
stated that the 1909 Copyright Act's list of categories of protected works
was "expanded specifically to include motion pictures," and quoted from
the House Report on the 1912 amendment:
The occasion for this proposed amendment is the fact that the
production of motion-picture photoplays and motion pictures
other than photoplays has become a business of vast proportions.
The money invested therein is so great and the property rights so
valuable that the committee is of the opinion that the copyright
112. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975) (footnote omitted)
(quoting Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). The court also referred to an 1801
English decision, which in turn quoted Lord Mansfield:
[W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community,
may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and
labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the
progress of the arts be retarded.
Id. at 156 n.6; see also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977) (stating
that copyright and patent laws "perhaps regard the 'reward to the owner [as] a secondary
consideration"' (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)),
but that those laws were 'intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights' in order to
afford greater encouragement to the production of works of benefit to the public." (quoting
Washingtonian Publ'g Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939))); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201
(1954). In Mazer, the court stated:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents
and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in "Science and useful Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.
Id. at 219. The Court has sometimes emphasized the reward to the author rather than the public
good. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985). The
court stated:
The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure contributors to the store of
knowledge a fair return for their labors .... "[This] limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the
creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and
to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of
exclusive control has expired."
Id. at 545-46 (citations omitted) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). An interesting historical perspective on public and private interests in
copyright is offered in Peter Jaszi; When Works Collide: Derivative Motion Picture, Underlying
Rights, and the Public Interest, 28 UCLA L. REv. 715, 803-06 (1981).
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laws ought to be amended as to give to them distinct and definite
recognition and protection."
13
Policy issues regarding the protection of derivative works were
discussed in Stewart v. Abend 1
4 and Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc.,'
15
which considered whether, if an author of a copyrighted story does not
survive to the renewal term and the heirs renew, a work derivative of the
story may be exploited without the heirs' consent. In Abend, the Supreme
Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the motion picture could
not be so exploited, thus effectively overruling the Second Circuit's
contrary decision in Rohauer. A review of these two decisions, as well, as
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Abend, both brings home the equitable
claims of authors of truly transformative works1 16 and reflects the
imprudence of establishing a single default rule that would affect the wide
range of derivative works.
The Second Circuit in Rohauer focused on the 1909 Act's provision
for derivative copyright, finding the statute's clear thrust the protection of
derivative works as new works. In its discussion, the court set out the
relevant policy considerations:
To such extent as it may be permissible to consider policy
considerations, the equities lie preponderantly in favor of the
proprietor of the derivative copyright. In contrast to the
situation where an assignee or licensee has done nothing more
than print, publicize and distribute a copyrighted story or novel,
a person who with the consent of the author has created an opera
or a motion picture film will often have made contributions
literary, musical and economic as great as or greater than the
original author.' 
17
The Supreme Court both rejected the statutory argument and
disagreed with the Rohauer court's policy views:
113. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 562 n.17 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 756 at 1 (1912)).
114. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
115. Rohauer v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 551 F.2d 484 (2nd Cir. 1977).
116. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The Court, discussing
the first factor of the fair use inquiry, stated:
The central purpose of the investigation is to see... whether the new work merely
"supersede[s] the objects" of the original creation.., or instead adds something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is "transformative." Although such transformative use is not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use ... the goal of copyright, to promote
science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.
Id. at 579.
117. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 493.
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The Court of Appeals in Rohauer... expressly implemented
policy considerations as a means of reconciling what it viewed
as the competing interest in that case. While the result in
Rohauer might make some sense in some contexts, it makes no
sense in others. In the case of a condensed book, for example,
the contribution by the derivative author may be little, while the
contribution by the original author is great. Yet, under the
Rohauer "rule," publication of the condensed book would not
infringe the pre-existing work even though the derivative author
has no license or valid grant of rights in the pre-existing work ....
Thus, even if the Rohauer "rule" made sense in terms of policy
in that case, it makes little sense when it is applied across the
derivative works spectrum. Indeed, in the view of the
commentators, Rohauer did not announce a "rule," but rather an
"interest-balancing approach."
'" 8
The Court also rejected the claim that the rule would undermine one
of the Copyright Act's policies-the dissemination of creative works-
either because the owner of the underlying work would wish to retire the
work or would make exorbitant demands." 9 The Court responded by
stating that "[t]hese arguments are better addressed by Congress than the
courts" and observed, somewhat optimistically, that "an initially high
asking price does not preclude bargaining."'' 20  The Court also stated,
"[m]oreover, although dissemination of creative works is a goal of the
Copyright Act, the Act creates a balance between the artist's right to
control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the
public's need for access to creative works."'
2'
The Supreme Court's policy view on the liability issue closely tracked
the Ninth Circuit's. 22 However, in a portion of the Ninth Circuit decision
118. Abend, 495 U.S. at 227 (citations omitted).
119. See id. at 228. Amici contended that Abend had demanded fifty percent of defendants'
gross proceeds over advertising expenses. See id.
120. Id. at 228.
121. See id. at 239. The Court apparently did not consider that those controlling a great
many works, such as music publishers, might decide to keep an asking price high because the
overall value of the works would be greater. See id. Also, in disregarding the possibility that
works might be retired, the Court essentially ignored the possibility that non-economic factors
may enter into the licensing process. See id.; see also Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153,
183-84 (1985) (white, J., dissenting) (listing films made under a first-term grant which were
removed from circulation and others, such as Gone With the Wind, which remained in circulation
because producers were willing to pay substantial sums to holders of copyrights in the underlying
works (citing Jaszi, supra note 112, at 740)).
122. See Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1476-77 n.16 (9th Cir. 1988), aff'd sub nom.
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207 (1990).
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which the Supreme Court did not address, 23 the Court of Appeals balanced
the equities:
Our holding does not mean, however, that the equities of this
case have no bearing on its outcome. We are mindful that this
case presents compelling equitable considerations which should
be taken into account by the district court in fashioning an
appropriate remedy in the event defendants fail to establish any
equitable defenses. Defendants invested substantial money,
effort, and talent in creating the "Rear Window" film. Clearly
the tremendous success of that venture initially and upon re-
release is attributable in significant measure to, inter alia, the
outstanding performances of its stars-Grace Kelly and James
Stewart-and the brilliant directing of Alfred Hitchcock. The
district court must recognize this contribution in determining
Abend's remedy. 1
24
The appellate court opined that an award of damages or a continuing
royalty rather than an injunction would be appropriate, stating:
The "Rear Window" film resulted from the collaborative efforts
of many talented individuals other than Cornell Woolrich, the
author of the underlying story. The success of the movie
resulted in large part from factors completely unrelated to the
underlying story, "It Had To Be Murder." It would cause a great
injustice for the owners of the film if the court enjoined them
from further exhibition of the movie. An injunction would also
effectively foreclose the defendants from enjoying legitimate
profits derived from exploitation of the "new matter" comprising
the derivative work, which is given express copyright protection
by section 7 of the 1909 Act. Since the defendants could not
possibly separate out the "new matter" from the underlying
work, their right to enjoy renewal copyright in the derivative
work would be rendered meaningless by the grant of an
injunction. We also note that an injunction could cause public
injury by denying the public the opportunity to view a classic
film for many years to come.
125
123. The Court stated, "whether the derivative work may continue to be published is a
matter of remedy, an issue which is not before us." Id.
124. Id. at 1478.
125. Id. at 1479. The court concluded, "[b]ecause factors other than Woolrich's story
clearly contributed to "Rear Window's" success, should the district court find that the defendants
have failed to establish any affirmative defense to the infringement, the district court should
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All of these courts, then, recognized the equitable claims of authors of truly
transformative works, although the Supreme Court's acknowledgment was
admittedly indirect and otherwise faint.
The value of derivative works has also been recognized in connection
with the derivative works exception to the termination provisions of the
1976 Copyright Act. 126  Under this exception, if a grantor exercises the
grantor's statutory right to terminate a grant, the grantee may continue to
exploit pre-termination derivative works in accordance with the terms of
the original grant. 127  The Second Circuit in Rohauer considered the
derivative works exception "evidence of a belief on the part of Congress of
the need for special protection for derivative works."'128  The Supreme
Court in Abend dismissed this argument, viewing the termination
provisions of the 1976 Act as the result of the "process of compromise
between competing special interests" rather than expressive of any
overarching Congressional policy for the protection of derivative works.'
29
This seems an ineffective refutation, considering that the same could be
said of legislation generally, and that the sentiment seems contrary to the
tenor of a prior Supreme Court decision directly addressing the derivativeworks exception.130 Notably, in a 1998 decision, the Second Circuit
award Abend actual damages and apportion profits between Abend and the defendants." Id. at
1480; see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (discussing Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479).
126. See 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1994); 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
127. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (1994).
128. Rohauer, 551 F.2d at 494 (citing S. REP. No. 473, at 111 (1975)).
129. Abend, 495 U.S. at 226. In fact, in the Court's view, the exception evidenced
Congressional recognition of the right of the author to sue for infringement absent the exception.
See id.
130. See Mills, 469 U.S. 153. The court considered whether the termination, pursuant to §
304(c) of the Copyright Act, by a composer's heirs of a grant to a music publisher of rights to the
1923 musical composition Who's Sorry Now terminated the publisher's right to continue to share
in royalties from previously licensed uses of the composition in sound recordings. Id. at 155-56.
The court concluded that the answer was no, basing its decision on the exception from the
termination provision of derivative works prepared pursuant to the grant. See id. at 154. The
court stated: "[t]he legislative history also indicates that Congress intended the termination
provisions to produce an accommodation and a balancing among various interests." Id. at 174
n.41 (citing to H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124, 140 (1976); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 108 (1975)).
The Court noted that the Second Circuit had "explained the need for the Exception as the interest
in protecting the large investment that is required to produce a motion picture, and recognized
that record companies similarly must also make a significant investment in compensating
vocalists, musicians, arrangers, and recording engineers." Id. at 175. The court explained that
"the termination right was expressly intended to relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised
and unremunerative giants that had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to
appreciate the true value of his work product." Id. at 172-73. "The Exception in § 304 (c)(6)(A)
was designed, however, to exclude a specific category of grants-even if they were manifestly
unfair to the author-from that broad objective. The purpose of the Exception was to 'preserve
the right of the owner of a derivative work to exploit it, notwithstanding the reversion."' Mills,
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reiterated its belief that the exception expressed Congressional intent.
131
The court stated that the purpose of the exception was "to protect public
access to the derivative work as well as the rights of persons who have
invested in creating the derivative work.' 32 Echoing an argument that the
Supreme Court had rejected in Abend, the Second Circuit stated, "without
the exception, the creator of a derivative work (and, indeed, the public at
large) could be held hostage to the potentially exorbitant demands of the
owner of the copyright in the underlying work.'
3 3
Encouraging the creation and dissemination of derivative works
inarguably advances the purposes of the Copyright Act just as the creation
of underlying works does. 134 In fact, truly transformative derivative works
469 U.S. at 173 (quoting HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D SESS., FURTHER
DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 39
(Comm. Print 1964)). The Court went on to say, "[t]he House Report that accompanied the 1976
Act, certainly persuasive legislative history, affirmatively supports this view. Regarding §
203(b), § 304(c)'s counterpart, it stated: 'This clause provides that, notwithstanding a termination,
a derivative work prepared earlier may 'continue to be utilized' under the conditions of the
terminated grant."' Id. at 173 n.40.
131. See Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Wamer/Chappel Music, Inc., 155 F.3d 17 (2d Cir.
1998).
132. Id. at 19. See also Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Transfer Rights and
the Derivative Works Exception, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 897, 912 (1987).
133. Fred Ahlert Music, 155 F.3d at 22. Notably, the court made these comments while
deciding against the derivative works holder. The court found that a record company whose
rights in a musical composition had been terminated could not license new uses of its derivative
recording, specifically, for use in a motion picture soundtrack and soundtrack album. See id.
134. Other commentators have addressed the importance of derivative works. See, e.g.,
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV.
989 (1997). Lemley proposes that a "radical improver" of an original work retain rights in the
added original expression, even though the use was unauthorized, which would, among other
things, give the improver power in licensing negotiations. See id. at 998. Lemley states:
[I]ntellectual property law represents a 'delicate balance' between the rights of
intellectual property owners and the rights of users, among them the next
generation of owners. That balance does not reflect merely a legislative
compromise between interest groups. Rather, it can be justified in economic terms
by the need to ensure not only the creation of entirely new works of intellectual
property, but also the creation of improvements to existing works.
Id. "It is not enough to say that intellectual property law favors 'creators,' for here we have
creators on both sides of the equation, and the law must choose between them." Id. See generally
Jaszi, supra note 112 (discussing importance of derivative works in general and the need to
distinguish between types of derivative works, focussing on the nature of motion pictures in
particular). But see Nagano, supra note 61, at 1187-89 (focusing on author of original work in
arguing that copyright policy in the form of "a careful balancing between creator incentive and
audience access" should be taken into consideration in new use cases). Several authors have
commented on the value of derivative works in very different contexts. See generally Alex
Kozinski and Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 513
(1999) (recognizing value of derivative works in a proposal regarding replacement of the fair use
doctrine a remedy scheme); Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 208-09 (1998) (recognizing value
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may eclipse the original's value to the public. Consequently, as discussed
below, a default rule favoring the author of an underlying work over the
grantee/author of a derivative work in new use cases can no more be
justified than a default rule favoring the author of a derivative work over
the grantor/author of an underlying work.
V. THE UNSUITABILITY OF DEFAULT RULES
In general, as the Second Circuit indicated in Boosey, resorting to
default rules to interpret the scope of a copyright grant should be
unnecessary. 35 Although many agreements will not specifically include a
particular technology in either a granting clause or a reservation clause, and
will lack a future technology clause, the instances in which contracts will
offer no clue to the parties' intent should be relatively rare. Even if the
parties' intent could not be ascertained, however, reference to a default rule
would be inappropriate.
A. Policy-Based Defaults
Copyright policy cannot support a blanket pro-grantor rule. Favoring
a grantor/author of an underlying work over a grantee/author of a derivative
work is particularly inapt for truly transformative derivative works, for
there are two authors to be rewarded and encouraged-the author of the
underlying work and the author of the derivative work.' 36 Furthermore, a
presumption that the parties intended to restrict the grantee's right to
exploit its own copyright does not fairly reflect the policies of the
Copyright Act or the parties' intent. Absent an indication to the contrary,
the presumption should be that no such intention was harbored. As the
Boosey court noted, "an approach to new use problems that tilts against
licensees gives rise to antiprogressive incentives. Motion picture producers
would be reluctant to explore and utilize innovative technologies for the
exhibition of movies if the consequences would be that they lost the right to
of derivative works in arguing that preliminary injunctions in intellectual property cases are often
unconstitutional prior restraints).
135. But see Fuller, supra note 36, at 610. Fuller contends that "[tlhe outcome of most
license-scope cases hinges [sic] more on the specific form and the approach utilized rather than
on the exact merits of each case" and argues for a uniform approach to the cases. See id. If Fuller
were correct about the significance of the approach used, this would reinforce the importance of
avoiding default rules, for contract interpretation at its heart should be a search for the parties'
intent.
136. Note that disputes often involve two grantees, neither of which is an author, each
claiming that a specific new technology falls within its grant. Default rules based on concerns
about protecting authors are far more likely to confuse than to illuminate that situation.
272 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:243
exhibit pictures containing licensed works."' 37 The language, in confusing
losing the right and not having it in the first place, is perhaps slightly
askew, but the point is made. Having either a pro-author or a pro-grantor
default rule would conflict with the aims of the Copyright Act.
38
Furthermore, a pro-grantor rule cannot be justified by reference to the
writing requirement or the general policy favoring certainty in copyright
ownership. That circular reasoning cannot aid in answering the question of
whether a writing that undeniably exists and indisputably transferred rights
in the underlying work, conveyed the rights at issue.
A pro-grantee rule, which Bartsch may or may not have suggested
(apparently as a matter of contract law), is similarly inappropriate. The
implicit recognition in Bartsch of the value of derivative works, essentially
a reference to copyright policy, is undoubtedly an important counterbalance
to the perception of the Ninth's Circuit's view. The Bartsch court found
that:
A further reason favoring the broader view in a case like this is
that it provides a single person who can make the copyrighted
work available to the public over the penumbral medium,
whereas the narrower one involves the risk that a deadlock
between the grantor and the grantee might prevent the work's
being shown over the new medium at all.
39
Furthermore, the court held that the grant language was "well designed to
give the assignee the broadest rights with respect to its copyrighted
property, to wit, the photoplay."'140 Although this perspective is important,
137. Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 488 n.4
(2d Cir. 1998).
138. Although, as the Supreme Court noted in Abend, the distinction between types of
derivative works could be considered, Congress has not made those distinctions. See generally
Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 216-36 (1990). Congress has given independent protection to
derivative works regardless of how thin the copyright in the additions. See id. The courts should
not undermine that independent protection for works which are more new than old by invoking
the specter of those thin copyrights. The level of transformation may nonetheless affect the
interpretation of the scope of a grant.
139. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968).
140. Id. at 154. Note that the latter finding arguably has intimations of the new property
right theory that the Supreme Court later rejected in Abend, 495 U.S. at 216-236. Bartsch, like
Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988), invokes policy not to decide
the issue but to support a conclusion otherwise reached. A more recent Second Circuit case
might be construed as having impliedly used copyright policy in a more significant way. In
Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 63 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1995), the court interpreted a grant of the right
to synchronize musical compositions with a motion picture to include the right to synchronize the
compositions with videocassettes. See id. at 630. The court then faced the argument that even if
that right was granted, the grantee did not have the right to publicly distribute or sell the
videocassettes because that separate exclusive right under the Copyright Act had not been
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and consistent with promoting the production and dissemination of works
to the public, it cannot justify the use of a pro-grantee default rule which
would automatically subordinate the interests of the author of the
underlying work to those of the author of the derivative work.
Copyright policy simply should not supply such rules.14 ' Because
flexibility is needed to achieve policy goals, a rigid default rule is
antithetical to such a notion. This is not to say that copyright policy,
including the aspects recognized explicitly by the Ninth Circuit and
implicitly by the Second Circuit, does not have a role to play in new use
cases. 142  That role, however, is far more complex than the creation of
artificial strictures.
B. An Existing Tie-Breaker: The Burden of Proof
Rather than create a default rule to resolve that rare situation in which
the intent of the parties cannot in any wise be divined, the courts should
look to existing procedure. Despite their many differences, the Second and
granted. See id. The court was unpersuaded, "we do not see any good reason why Disney should
not be able to dispose of these lawfully made copies as it wishes." Id. at 632. The court also
rejected the argument that plaintiff had received no reward for the sale of videos. See id. "Under
the circumstances of this case, it may fairly be said that [Bourne] has received [its] reward for the
use of the article." Id. (quoting Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d
Cir. 1963)). The court also observed that "a contrary interpretation would leave Disney in the
position of having received a license to produce videocassettes of its motion pictures for home
viewing by consumers, but being unable to sell or otherwise dispose of the videocassettes." Id. at
632 n.4.
141. Some commentators have supported default rules peculiar to the interpretation of the
scope of copyright licenses. See, e.g., Barbara D. Griff, Note, A New Use For An Old License:
Who Owns The Right?, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 53, 84 (1995) (advocating a "statutory scheme of
default rules finding new use rights in the grantee but providing for royalties to the grantor,
subject to contrary agreement by the parties); Nagano, supra note 61, at 1184 (arguing that "in the
gray area situation... it would generally be fairest to hold that new use rights are not included in
the license," but going on to say that courts should consider "equities of the parties" and
copyright policy in individual cases); Joanne Benoit Nakos, Comment, An Analysis of the Effect
of New Technology On the Rights Conveyed By Copyright License Agreements, 25 CUMB. L.
REv. 433, 434, 455 (1995) (arguing that "any ambiguity should be construed in favor of the
licensor: a strict approach to interpreting copyright licensing agreements, reserving all uses not
expressly granted to the licensor, is the best approach" and suggesting "[t]o prevent a harsh result
for the licensee, remedies under the theory of implied negative covenant are available"); Saez,
supra note 23, at 372 (finding Nimmer's core meaning approach to be the best available method
when the agreement includes neither future a technology clause nor a continuous royalty
provision); cf. Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Don't Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright's
New-Use Doctrine to The Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899,
925-26 (1995) (proposing that "grants be interpreted broadly, following Bartsch, in all
circumstances in which the contract is silent, the parties' intents cannot be gauged, and no
unconscionability is present").
142. See discussion infra Part VI.
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Ninth Circuits have agreed on a point that acts as a tie-breaker: placement
of the burden of proof. In S.O.S., the Ninth Circuit stated that to prevail on
its claims of copyright infringement, the plaintiff had to prove ownership of
the programs at issue and "'copying' of protectable expression by
[defendant] beyond the scope of [defendant]'s license.' 43  The Second
Circuit cited to S.O.S. in Bourne,144 after stating its own conclusion that
"where only the scope of the license [as opposed to its existence] is at
issue, the copyright owner bears the burden of proving that the defendant's
copying is unauthorized."'145 Thus, if the scales are balanced, the grantee
will prevail.
VI. THE ROLE OF COPYRIGHT POLICY IN THE NEW USE ANALYSIS
As the Ninth Circuit has expressly recognized, copyright policy
should affect the interpretation of the scope of copyright licenses. The
most appropriate role may be in the development of federal common law
rules of contract construction particular to these types of cases." At a
minimum, state rules of construction should be consciously tested against
copyright policy. The Ninth Circuit has taken this step, rejecting in this
context an interpretive rule that it believed was contrary to that policy.
147
Whether or not one agrees with the court's conclusion in this instance, the
Ninth Circuit's approach of so subordinating state rules should be
followed. 148
143. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 866 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989).
144. See Bourne, 68 F.3d at 631.
145. Id.; see also I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing S.O.S., 886
F.2d at 1087).
146. This should be contrasted with cases in which the scope of the agreement is not at
issue, such as assignments of royalty interests. See, e.g., Yount v. Acuff Rose-Opryland, 103
F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 1996) ("When Yount transferred the underlying copyright, he obtained a
contractual right to royalties. He no longer had a copyright; he had a mere contractual right ....
At that point federal copyright law essentially ceased to be concerned with how that contractual
royalty right or assignment of it would be enforced.").
147. See S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989). In essence, the
court determined that in the federal common law applicable to the interpretation of the scope of
copyright licenses, the rule of construction against the drafter should not apply (at least when the
drafter is the grantor). See id.
148. See Johnson v. Jones, 885 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds 149 F.3d 494 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that "[i]nterpretation of a
contractual license in light of copyright policy is necessary only if intent cannot be otherwise
ascertained from contract language and surrounding circumstances"). Courts have also
subordinated rules in other contexts when the rules conflict with the Copyright Act. See Walthal
v. Rusk, 172 F.3d 481, 485 (7th Cit. 1999) (finding that a contract of unspecified duration could
be terminated under Illinois law, the court stated, "[i]n general, state contract laws pertain to the
transfer of interests under the Copyright Act... [h]owever... state contract law cannot provide
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Apparently no court has so far adopted the idea of displacing state
contract law with federal common law when interpreting the scope of
copyright licenses. 4 9 The Second Circuit, which squarely faced the issue
in Bartsch, rejected the idea outright: "The development of a 'federal
common law' of contracts is justified only when required by a distinctive
national policy and. . . 'the general interest that copyrights, like all other
forms of property, should be enjoyed by their true owner is not enough to
meet this ... test."' 150  The Seventh Circuit has agreed, "[wihen the
defendants claim a license, as they have in this case, we may conside
r the validity or scope of that license and typically must apply the
relevant state law in that determination."''51 The Fifth Circuit, in a
distinguishable context, considered the question but found state law
applicable. 152  Notable new use decisions by other circuit courts do not
address the issue.1
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the basis of a decision if that law conflicts with federal law"); P.C. Films Corp. v. MGM/UA
Home Video, Inc., 138 F.3d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing an open issue regarding
whether purporting to grant a perpetual license is contrary to federal copyright law and policy);
Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that application of California
law under which a contract of unspecified duration was terminable at will directly conflicted with
§ 203 of the Copyright Act). The point made here is that the courts themselves should address
the question of conflict on every issue considered in determining the scope of a license.
149. The standard is admittedly high. The Supreme Court has stated:
[I]nstances [of federal common law] are "few and restricted," and fall into
essentially two categories: those in which a federal rule of decision is "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interest," and those in which Congress has given the courts
the power to develop substantive law .... Absent some congressional
authorization to formulate substantive rules of decisions, federal common law exists
only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the
United States, interstate and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights
of States or our relationships with foreign nations, and admiralty cases.
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 629, 640-41 (1981) (citations omitted)
(quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964)).
150. Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 391 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting
T.B. Harms v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964)). The court continued, "[tihe fact that
plaintiff is seeking a remedy granted by Congress to copyright owners removes any problem of
federal jurisdiction but does not mean that federal principles must govern the disposition of every
aspect of her claim." Id. at 154; see also De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Vestron,
Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 839 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988).
151. I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 774 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996).
152. See Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick International, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 483 (5th Cir.
1981). The Fifth Circuit, considering the issue of whether failure to place a copyright notice on
each recording as specified in the contract was a breach of a condition precedent or merely breach
of a covenant, stated, "[w]hile the context of copyright law in which the agreement exists cannot
be overlooked, application of Georgia rules to determine parties' contractual intent is not
preempted by either Copyright Act nor does their application violate federal copyright policy."
Id. The court noted:
It is possible to hypothesize situations where application of particular state rules of
construction would so alter rights granted by the copyright statutes as to invade the
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The Bartsch court's view slights both the importance of the
ownership issue to the federal scheme and the more general purposes of the
Copyright Act. One of the "paramount goals" of the 1976 Act (which post-
dates Bartsch) is certainty with regard to ownership. 154 The Ninth Circuit,
discussing the requirement in § 204 of the 1976 Act that a transfer of a
copyright interest be in writing, stated:
Section 204 ensures that the creator of a work will not give away
his copyright inadvertently and forces a party who wants to use
the copyrighted work to negotiate with the creator to determine
precisely what rights are being transferred and at what price.
Most importantly, section 204 enhances predictability and
certainty of copyright ownership--"Congress' paramount goal"
when it revised the Act in 1976. Rather than look to the courts
every time they disagree as to whether a particular use of the
work violates their mutual understanding, parties need only look
to the writing that sets out their respective rights.... Section
204's writing requirement is not unduly burdensome; it
necessitates neither protracted negotiations nor substantial
expense. The rule is really quite simple: If the copyright holder
agrees to transfer ownership to another party, that party must get
the copyright holder to sign a piece of paper saying so. It
doesn't have to be the Magna Charta; a one-line pro forma
statement will do.
55
scope of copyright law or violate its policies. We need not, however, set forth these
extreme situations for it is clear that the application of Georgia rules of construction
in the case at bar is not one of them.
Id.
153. See Bloom v. Hearst Entertainment, Inc., 33 F.3d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1994) (not
addressing choice of law, but applying New York law); Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1384 (1st
Cir. 1993) (not addressing federal/state choice of law issue, but applying Massachusetts law);
Trust Co. Bank v. MGMIUA Entertainment Co., 772 F.2d 740 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (not addressing
law applied). Then-proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code (now "UCITA")
sparked much discussion about the relationship between federal and state law in connection with
transfers of copyright. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945, 960 (1998),
opining:
Even where the parties' agreement is sufficiently formal to transfer exclusive rights
under copyright, section 2B-307 will still define its scope, unless the parties specify
otherwise in an authenticated record. There is no conflict with federal copyright
law, because questions going to the scope of a grant (as opposed to its validity) are
considered matters of state contract law.
Id.; see also Lemley, supra note 134, at 158-63 (discussing relationship of federal and state law
in context of copyright transfers).
154. See Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 557 (9th Cir. 1990).
155. See Effects Assocs., 908 F.2d at 557 (citations omitted); see also I.A.E., 74 F.3d at 775
("The writing requirement serves goal of predictability and certainty of copyright ownership.");
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The writing requirement advances the cause of certainty of copyright
ownership by ensuring that an agreement of transfer exists. 156 The scope of
that agreement is equally important, however. At issue is who, without
infringing, may exercise any of the exclusive rights under the Copyright
Act. Federal law indisputably governs the question of infringement;
federal law should also govern the interpretation of the scope of a transfer
agreement. 
57
Another compelling reason to adopt federal common law to determine
whether the grantor or the grantee has the right to exploit a work in a new
medium is that, contrary to the Bartsch court's suggestion, the identity of
the owner has significant implications for copyright policy. Ownership
does not simply determine who is in control of a copyrighted work at any
Konigsberg Int'l. Inc. v. Rice, 16 F.3d 355 (9th Cir. 1994); Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco
Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that the requirement of a written statement for
work for hire has a purpose beyond statute of frauds; the additional purpose is "to make the
ownership of property rights in intellectual property clear and definite, so that such property will
be readily marketable"). The importance of certainty in determining ownership is reflected as
well in the Copyright Act's provisions for the recordation of copyright assignments. Although
recordation is voluntary, a strong incentive for recording exists; for if two existing transfers
conflict, the second in time will prevail if it is recorded and if the first transferee failed to record
within three months of transfer. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also
Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976) (mandating that assignment of
copyright must be in writing). Further, "the Copyright Act of 1909 required that an assignment of
copyright ownership must be recorded within three months after its execution, or it would be void
against subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration who took without notice, and who duly
recorded the assignment." Bums v. Rockwood Distrib. Co., 481 F. Supp. 841, 847 n.9 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (citing § 44 of the 1909 Copyright Act).
156. See Effects, 908 F.2d at 557. Note that under the 1909 Copyright Act, "[a] transfer of
anything less than a totality of a work is a license and not an assignment." International Film
Exchange, Ltd. v. Corinth Films, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 631, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). "[E]xclusive
licenses could be granted orally or by conduct." Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co.,
697 F.2d 27, 36 (2d Cir. 1982). The argument could thus be made that the case for invoking
policy to interpret 1909 Copyright Act licenses is weaker than for 1976 Copyright Act licenses.
However, "where principles compelled under the Copyright Act of 1976 are not precluded by
decisions rendered under the 1909 Act, those principles should be implemented to the extent
possible." Jerry Vogel Music Co. v. Warner Bros., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 172, 175 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
157. Notably, many courts have at least implicitly applied federal law in determining
whether an oral or implied non-exclusive license exists. See, e.g., Graham v. James, 144 F.3d
229, 235 (2d Cir. 1998); IA.E., 74 F.3d at 775-76; Avtec Sys. Inc. v. Pfeiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574
n.12 (4th Cir. 1994); Pinkham v. Sara Lee Corp., 983 F.2d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 1992); Maclean
Assocs. v. WM. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 778-79 (3d Cir. 1991);
Effects, 908 F.2d at 558. But see Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broad. Servs. Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 880
n.7 (5th Cir. 1997) ("To the extent that it is not inconsistent with the Copyright Act and its
policies, Texas law governs our analysis of whether the parties contractually created a non-
exclusive license."); Jacob Maxwell, Inc. v. Veeck, 110 F.3d 749, 752 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1997).
Considering that a non-exclusive license does not transfer ownership, it seems anomalous to
apply federal law to resolve the issue while applying state law to determine the scope of a license
transferring ownership.
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particular time, but also affects the likelihood of dissemination of the work.
The Bartsch court itself cited to the fact that the grantee there was the only
one in a position to ensure that the motion picture at issue could appear on
television.1 58  Although the court did not say so, this consideration, in
addition to being relevant to the question of the parties' intent, reflects the
concerns of copyright policy. 1
59
An explicitly, rather than implicitly, created federal common law of
copyright would allow the development of contract interpretation principles
openly accommodating the purposes and policies underlying the Copyright
Act. Absent any contrary indication in an agreement, the assumption
should be that the parties intended to act in accordance with those purposes
and policies, of which they should be deemed to have been aware. 60  In
construing transfer agreements, courts should consequently consider,
among other things: the importance of rewarding and encouraging further
creation by the author of the original work and, in that regard, the
significance of first publication; 16 1 the equally important need to reward
authors of, and encourage the production of, transformative derivative
works; and the overriding need to benefit the public. Policy should be
158. See Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155. Note that "ownership" from a copyright perspective was
not technically at issue in Bartsch. The case was decided in the 1909 Copyright Act era, when,
under the indivisibility doctrine, a transfer of less than the entire bundle of copyright rights was
not considered a transfer of ownership.
159. See, e.g., Abend, 863 F.2d at 1479. In the Ninth Circuit's discussion regarding an
appropriate remedy in Abend, the court both recognized the right of the derivative work owner to
exploit its material added to the underlying work and recognized the benefit to the public of
disseminating the derivative work. See id.; see also supra note 112. Another example, on a
different issue, of the significance of the identity of an owners concerns whether a contract is
sufficient to transfer rights in a renewal period is affected by the identity of the grantor. If the
owner/grantor is an individual, rights in the renewal period are presumed not granted and words
such as "through the renewal periods," or "including extensions," "forever" or "perpetuity" are
required to effect that transfer. See generally P.C. Films, 138 F.3d at 457. If the grantor is a
corporation, however, no such requirements obtain. Id. These are judge-created rules derived
from the perceived Congressional intent that the renewal term was to benefit the author. Id.
160. "Laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract, and where it is
to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as fully as if they had been expressly referred to
or incorporated in its terms." Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Amer. Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 449 U.S.
117, 130 (1991) (quoting Farmers & Merchants Bank of Monroe v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, 262 U.S. 649, 660 (1923)).
161. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), the
Supreme Court recognized the right of first publication as especially valuable. "The scope of fair
use is narrower with respect to unpublished works .... The right of first publication
encompasses not only the choice whether to publish at all, but also the choices of when, where,
and in what form first to publish a work." Id. at 564.
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taken into consideration as part of the context of the creation of the
contract-that is, as a component of the search for the parties' meaning.
62
Policy should infuse the analysis, beginning with framing the
question-an exercise that often determines the outcome. For example,
where the license is for the creation and dissemination of a truly
transformative derivative work, the relevant question may well be whether
the parties intended to restrict the dissemination of the work. So presented,
the apparent tension between Bartsch/Boosey and Cohen dissipates. No
intent to restrict the dissemination of the work to be created was apparent in
the licenses in the former; the latter, however, specified how the new work
was to be disseminated. 63 If the search for intent leads to the conclusion
that the use does not fall within the grant, copyright policy should also be
instrumental in fashioning a remedy from among the myriad choices and in
determining whether the grantor may exploit the underlying work in the
new medium or simply prevent the derivative work owner from doing so.
64
The exercise of exclusive rights under the Copyright Act should not
be shadowed by uncertainty about the effect of choice of law rules and the
substantive law of at least fifty different jurisdictions. Domicile is perhaps
the least appropriate default mechanism for resolving issues regarding the
scope of a copyright transfer. The desirability of uniformity on the many
principles of construction on which a new use issue could turn is manifest.
Federal common law, not state law, should determine, for example: 1)
162. It may, for example, matter whether a license of rights in a musical composition is for
distribution of the sheet music for the composition, for use in a sound recording or for use in a
motion picture. It may not be reasonable to presume that the parties intended that a grantee
motion picture company, which proposed to invest millions in a derivative work, would be unable
to disseminate that work to the public in all available ways. If the parties arranged for separate
payments for various methods of distribution, however, it may well be reasonable to imply a price
term for use in the new technology.
163. With the question cast this way, foresecability may drop out of the inquiry altogether.
If it does not, copyright policy should also be considered in framing that pertinent question: is the
issue whether the parties foresaw technological change as a general matter (the answer for any
work still in copyright must be yes), whether the parties foresaw the specific technology at issue,
or something in between?
164. The possibilities for remedies include, for example, traditional infringement remedies
to non-exclusive licenses and ongoing royalties. Regarding possible restrictions on a prevailing
grantor's use of the grantor's work, some courts have found negative covenants that the grantors
would not exercise rights which were found to fall outside the grant but which, if exercised, could
have displaced the market for the rights granted. See, e.g., Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.S. 317,
327 (1920); Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 165 (N.Y. 1933). This is
an especially critical issue, for the effect of such a decision is to freeze the rights, which carries
significant potential negative repercussions. The copyright implications are profound and should
be carefully considered and applied in a uniform manner.
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whether the principles of ejusdem generis 65  apply to a grant or a
reservation clause; 2) the significance of a general reservation; 3) whether a
license prohibits any use not granted; 4) the importance of technical
distinctions between media expressly included in a grant and the medium at
issue; 166 5) whether and how rights in unknown technology may be
conveyed; 167 6) whether foreseeability is relevant, and if so, by whom the
new use must have been foreseen (e.g., awareness by either party, both
parties, neither party, the general public, knowledgeable persons in the
industry or inventors in their garages); 168 7) how to determine whether the
agreement is integrated; 8) the circumstances under which extrinsic
evidence may be admitted (i.e. to create an ambiguity or only to choose
between two meanings of which the agreement is, on its face,
165. The ejusdem generis rule states that "when a general word or phrase follows a list of
specific persons or things, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only persons
or things of the same type as those listed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 535 (7th ed. 1999).
166. As a commentator noted when discussing Cohen, many of the characteristics relied
upon by the court to distinguish videocassette from television "are either no longer true or will
not be true in the near future." Saez, supra note 23, at 373.
167. The importance of this issue is obvious, and risking inconsistent outcomes through the
application of state law is inappropriate. Notably, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Second
Circuit appears to have directly confronted the issue of unknown technology in the face of a
broad, but not complete, grant of rights. See generally Griff, supra note 141.
168. The standard used for assessing foreseeability in a new use case may be critical to the
outcome. For example, the Second Circuit in Boosey, in considering the foreseeability of video,
referred to general "home viewing" technology. See Boosey & Hawkes Music Publishers, Inc. v.
Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit in Cohen defined the
relevant technology as VCRs. See Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th
Cir. 1988). Compare Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956), with
Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154. Considering a 1936 contract with a prizefighter for the right to
distribute a film of a fight, the Ettore court stated that "[c]ommercial television.., was not in
existence at the time." Ettore, 229 F.2d at 491. The court went on to state that television was
almost as old as radio, "yet almost twenty years after radio became commonplace in America,
television is still, largely, in an experimental stage as far as society is concerned." Id. at 491 n. 14
(quoting ROGER BURL1NGAME, ENGINES OF DEMOCRACY 460 (1940)). In Bartsch, the court
approved the trial court's finding that "'[d]uring 1930 the future possibilities of television were
recognized by knowledgeable people in the entertainment and motion picture industries,' though
surely not in the scope it has attained." Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 (citation omitted). The court
distinguished Ettore on the ground that the grantor in Bartsch was an experienced businessman as
opposed to a prizefighter, and stated that the Ettore court "relied heavily on [the prizefighter's]
lack of sophistication in determining whether it was fair to charge him with knowledge of the new
medium." Id. at 154 n.2. Ettore, however, does not seem to support that distinction. See
generally Ettore, 229 F.2d 481. The point of departure of the Bartsch and Ettore courts appears
rather to have been the standard for foreseeability. See id. The Ettore court found the lack of
commercial use of television compelling. See id. at 491. In contrast, the Bartsch court found
awareness of "future possibilities," by those knowledgeable in the industry, sufficient. See
Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154.
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susceptible);169 9) appropriate remedies; and 10) any implied restrictions on
a prevailing grantor's ability to exploit its work.
Although the federal courts will no doubt experience much conflict in
their approaches to these issues, invocation of federal common law is
unlikely to heighten the existing conflicts and may considerably lessen
them. At the very least, the source of the conflicts would be laid bare as
the layer of state laws of construction was stripped away. Clarification of
the courts' differences, and reasoning set forth on a more confined canvas,
is likely to lead to resolution of at least some of those differences.
Sustained circuit conflicts on matters of federal law are not the norm; the
courts, sometimes by inches, tend to move toward the middle ground.
VII. CONCLUSION
The strong temptation in the new use area is to attempt to distill
absolute rules that, correctly applied, will predict the outcome of every
dispute. Text is closely read, comparisons are made, and charts and graphs
are drawn in an effort to reduce the new use analysis to a series of
equations with various terms and only two possible solutions. In the end,
however, the search for mathematical certainty must fail.
The introduction of a default rule, policy-based or otherwise, would
add no certainty to the interpretation of the scope of a copyright transfer,
for the cases are too fact-specific. Default rules of any kind are rarely
necessary in this context, and pose the danger of rigid application in
completely different factual settings. That an agreement susceptible of two
different meanings is considered "ambiguous" does not mean that there is
nothing to choose between those two meanings. Ambiguity is a rather low
threshold, driven down over the years as the parol evidence rule has
169. Contrast California's "permissive approach to extrinsic evidence in contract
interpretation," pursuant to which "even if a contract appears to be absolutely clear on its face, the
court is required to engage in preliminary consideration of extrinsic evidence to see whether it
creates an ambiguity," Barris Indus., Inc. v. Worldvision Enters, Inc., 875 F.2d 1446, 1450 (9th
Cir. 1989), with New York's approach. Under the latter, extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent
is admissible only after a finding by the court that the agreement is ambiguous, that is, "it is
capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person
who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement and who is cognizant of the
customs, practices, usages and terminology as generally understood in the particular trade or
business." Raine v. CBS, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 434, 443-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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declined in favor (implicitly, if not explicitly), 170 and a finding of
ambiguity means only that extrinsic evidence can be taken into
consideration. Perhaps that evidence will swing the balance, perhaps it will
not. The evidence is unlikely to so even the scales, however, that the
meaning which the parties more likely than not intended cannot be
determined. If it does, then the use will be permitted, for the grantor, who
bore the burden of proving that the use was beyond the scope of the license,
will have failed to carry that burden.
Although copyright policy should not be used to create artificial rules,
it should be considered in the interpretation of grants of rights. By their
nature, licenses dealing with copyrighted material implicate copyright
policies. Policy should be taken into consideration throughout the process
of interpretation as part of the context of the creation of the contract-from
the framing of the relevant questions through the search for the parties'
meaning, and on to the determination of appropriate remedies. Although
the optimal solution would be to use copyright policy in the explicit
development of a federal common law addressing the interpretation of the
scope of copyright transfers, the minimum role that policy should play is in
the conscious, pre-application testing of state law rules of contract
construction.
A Practical Afterthought for Licenses to Come
By now, sweeping future technology clauses are commonly included
in licenses-broad and vague has been considered the best protection.
Unless the grant at issue is an all-rights grant, however, the possibility of
competing future technology clauses is strong. For example, the grant may
be of rights to distribute a motion picture by television, and include a future
technology clause referring back to that medium. A third party may have
been granted the right to distribute the film by videocassette for home
viewing, with a future technology clause referring back to that medium.
Which party, if either, has the right to distribute the motion picture on
170. But see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261,
307 (1985).
Conventional wisdom holds that... the contextualists have swept the field. The
[Uniform Commercial] Code and the Second Restatement have abandoned the
plain-meaning rule and eviscerated the parol evidence rule. However, a close
examination of the case law reveals a surprisingly different picture. In numerous
cases, courts are unwilling to accept the full implications of contextualization; in
one guise or another, they still invoke the primacy of express, written texts to
exclude extrinsic evidence.
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demand through the Internet for viewing on a television screen? To
address these issues, negotiators will be tempted to go from sweeping
clauses to very specific definitions. That way lies madness, however, for
courts would have to be educated on complex technological issues and may
feel compelled to shoehorn the medium at issue, which may be a new
hybrid, into one place or another.
Alternatives to grants by medium should be explored. One approach
would be to focus on the uses to which the grantee may put the work by,
for example, licensing by place (e.g., home), by user (public, defined sub-
groups, individuals) or through a hybrid (e.g., individuals, for personal
viewing). Another approach would be to address the form of revenues
generated (e.g., advertising-based, subscription-based, rental, sale).
Although these would not eliminate new use problems, they might greatly
reduce them and could perhaps avoid various costs associated with working
out complicated technical matters in the courts. These types of breakdowns
do not in most instances represent traditional market divisions, and many
distributors are not equipped to handle such licensing categories. Leading
may be preferable to following, however, for many of these licenses are
destined to outlast the current market structure.
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